Thisenormous, fragile complexity of human existence is the reason Jaspers is sceptical about the "hard" sciences, their complacency, and even their triumphalism. Ultimately, he sees the theory of the hard sciences with its classificatory sweeping approach as incomplete, such that it must be supplemented by the concrete practice of a psychiatristphilosopher with his or her concrete moral and aesthetic choices, with his or her mentality and lifestyle. Only this broad encompassing attitude can accommodate justly and generously a human existence and particularly a psychiatric patient's existence, suffering pathologically from the constant pressure of the limit-situations.
Neural Networks and Psychopathology. Dan J Stein, Jacques Ludik, editors. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1998.371 p. US$85.00.
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Advances in technology have always influenced our conception of the mind. Before the beginning ofthe 20th century, the most remarkable innovation in the industrial revolution was the steam engine, and perhaps not coincidentally Freud's theory of repression was at the time referred to as a "hydraulic model"; if pressure (that is, drive) is capped at one place, it must necessarily escape somewhere else, such as in symptom formation. Later, the invention of the telephone led to a "switchboard" model of the brain, in which neural connections are hard-wired, much like the plug boards used by the early telephone operators. The development of the digital computer led to a revolution not only in computation but also in our theories. We began to talk of "short-term" and "longterm" memory and the "storage capacity" of the brain. It was quickly realized, though, that the way we think is not adequately modeled by a von Neumann-type computer, where instructions are carried out one at a time and data are retrieved from memory in a similarly linear, sequential manner. Over the last few years, advances in computer technology have led to parallel processors (whereby many tasks are executed simultaneously) and neural networks (in which parallel processors are "trained" to differentiate between correct and incorrect answers). It was only a matter of time before researchers attempted to use these new computer models as analogues for human cognition. The recent book, Neural Networks and Psychopathology, edited by Dan Stein and Jacques Ludik,brings together original articles by some ofthe leading theoreticians and researchers in the field, attempting to demonstrate how neural networks can help us understand various aspects of psychopathology. The 12 chapters are evenly dividedbetween 2 sections: General Concepts and Clinical Disorders. In the first chapter, Stein and Ludik provide a relatively nontechnical introduction to neural networks and their application to psychopathology. This is followed by Manfred Spitzer on the history of neural network research in psychopathology. Chen and Berrios explain how neural networks can be used to model the process ofpsychiatric diagnosis and symptom recognition. Park shows how neural network models can mimic the effects of dopamine and serotonin on basic processes, such as learning and attention, and how the results of the models are consistent with research in the areas of depression and schizophrenia. Casper follows this with a chapter on "connectionism" (an alternate jargon term for neural networks) in relation to psychotherapy. The last chapter in this section, by Hestenes, proposes a theoretical model for biological psychiatry based on principles from neural network theory.
The second part ofthe book contains chapters in which neural network theory is applied to specific clinical disorders, such as delusions (Chen and Berrios; Vinogradov, Poole, and Willis-Shore), obsessive--eompulsive disorders (Ludik and Stein), autism (Cohen), and epilepsy and Alzheimer's disease (Wallenstein and Hasselmo). There is also a chapter by Lloyd that attempts to explain, using a neural network model, Breuer and Freud's analysis of Lucy R.
To the degree that the book intends to demonstrate that neural networks can model clinical and research findings, it is partially successful. Much depends on our willingness to accept that these computer simulations are accurate analogues of mental states. For example, one possible result of a simulation is called a "parasitic state," in which the pattern ofactivation of the "neurons" in the system converges to a specific output. The introductory chapter cites one pioneer in this field, who writes, "These parasitic states ... can markedly disrupt the integrity of neural network functioning by inducing 'alien forces' that distort and control the flow of mentation. If a similar reorganization of the schizophrenic's memory capabilities has taken place, it would not be at all surprising for him to report one or more schneiderian [sic] symptoms, namely, that he no longer has control ofhis thoughts, or that his mind is possessed by alien forces." To some (including me), this is stretching an analogy past its breaking point. On the other hand, Park's chapter on psychopharmacology sticks to the data and presents a fascinating example of how neural networks can elucidate the interaction between dopaminergic and serotoninergic pathways, leading to new and reasonable hypotheses that can be tested in the laboratory.
Most new movements, be they political or scientific, attempt to demonstrate their legitimacy by emphasizing their links with historical figures. Connectionism is no different in this regard. At different points in this book, Freud, Erikson, Olds, Meichenbaum, and Piaget, among others, are cited as early (if unknowing) connectionists. Unfortunately, this leads to the impression that there is little new, other than the attempt to model these theories with a computer. Indeed, the chapter on neural networks in psychotherapy ends with a series of "consequences" purportedly derived from connectionist theory, The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry Vol 44, No6 such as "Strong attempts at changing a system often activate strong resistance." Few experienced therapists would argue with any ofthese conclusions, irrespective oftheir theoretical orientation. But do not shortchange this field. Neural network modelling goes beyond the armchair speculations of the previous generation of theorists; testable, refutable hypotheses are proposed, putting this field on a firmer scientific basis.
As with most edited books, some chapters are pearls, and others contribute little to our understanding. In balance, this is an interesting book that should be read with a few caveats in mind. First, neural network theory is a new area, and most of the chapters can be best described as works in progress. This may pose a problem for those who want closure regarding what neural networks can tell us, but not for those who want to learn about a new area and its future directions. Second, despite numerous chapters describing the application of neural networks to the modelling of symptoms, such as delusions and obsessive-compulsive disorders, the most successful chapters are those that attempt to model biological and neurological processes. These chapters are less speculative, do not rely as much on argument by analogy, and present testable hypotheses for future clinical and basic research. Finally, the limitations of neural network theory, articulated by Vinogradov and others, must be borne in mind: "[C]onnectionist modeling continues to struggle to develop cogent schemas for relatively simple memory phenomena; it is not yet able to account for all of the rich and complex attentional, contextual, and affective inputs that must influence the formation and retrieval of abnormal memories in susceptible individuals. Rather, the usefulness ofthe connectionist approach to understanding what we observe clinically and to planning future research is illustrated."
Forensic Psychiatry
The Psychiatrist in Court: A Survival Guide and The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness. Thomas G Gutheil. Washington (DC): American Psychiatric Press; 1998. 126 P and 150 p. 2 volumes, US$45.00.
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Perhaps it is appropriate that the author of an important paper on boundary violations has written 2 volumes on medicolegal aspects of psychiatry (1). The Psychiatrist in Court: A Survival Guide is a pragmatically oriented, easy-to-read, informally written guide for the psychiatrist with little or no experience of what Gutheil calls a "foreign country," the courtroom. Gutheil is obviously an experienced and effective forensic psychiatrist. The organization of his mind is evident in the way he presents the material in this book. It is not a scholarly tome, but it covers in a reasonably comprehensive manner (in just over 100 pages) important aspects about appearing in court and preparing for doing so. Reading this book prior to appearing in court would have reduced my anxiety and made me less vulnerable in many situations. Psychiatrists will benefit from reading this book not just when they know they are going to court but also in preparation for the everpresent possibility of doing so. The book is easy and light reading; a clinician would profit by reading it once, evenif there were little prospect of going to court, and by reviewing parts ofit when some aspect ofpractice took a legal turn."The Court Room is Foreign Country" introduces the clinician to the landscape of court. "Personnel and Procedures of the Court Room" describes the court and the rules followed there. Gutheil puts the reader in his shoes by describing dialogues that might occur in court and presenting short vignettes. "Types of Witnesses" makes an important contrast between the therapist, who is a "fact" witness, and the expert witness. Gutheil describes common pitfalls of the psychotherapist in court. "Depositions and How to Survive Them" gives practical advice for dealing with pretrial encounters with attomeys.
"The Trial Itself' details the trial preparation and identifies pitfalls to avoid. "Writing for Court" addresses an aspect of medicolegal practice that many more psychiatrists will be involved in than those who go to court-preparing medicolegal reports. "Specific Roles for the Psychiatrist in Court" describes various scenarios in which one might be involved,including being sued by a patient, testifying when one's patient sues someone else, and testifying when one's patient is a defendant. A very important appendix, "On Wearing Two Hats," effectively illustrates the role conflict in serving as both psychotherapist and expert witness. Gutheil tellingly shows the difficulties inherent in this dual role.
The Psychiatrist in Court is written from a psychodynamically informed viewpoint. The advice it offers is compassionate to both psychiatrist and patient, practical, and realistic. Given the modest length of this book, I can think of nothing better to read that would help prepare the neophyte psychiatric witness for court.
The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness, as its title suggests, is more specialized than its companion volume. It is equally reader-friendly and, given that it is only 150 pages long,comprehensively covers important aspects ofbeing an expertwitness. Gutheil introduces the subject with a discussion of what makes an expert, describing the adversarial contest and"hired gun problem" among others. "The Expert's Ethical Universe" deals with problems of loyalty and communication. One asset ofthis book is Gutheil' s practicality in his attempts to help the psychiatrist become an expert witness. He dealsin "First Principles" with initial negotiations with the retaining attorney, how to review a case critically, and the "causationor connection" dilemma. Gutheil provides a chapter describing types oftypical cases, both civil and criminal. He also devotes
